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Price and Rate Regulations
for the Mexican Natural Gas
Industry: Comments on Policy
Decisions
Juan Rosellón*
Abstract: After the regulatory reform experienced in the Mexican gas sector, three areas with market power remained. Production is a legal
monopoly of Pemex. Transportation and distribution are natural monopo
lies. Distributor’s gas sales to (mainly residential) customers are poten tially monopolistie in case oflack ofcompetition from rnarketers or substi
tute fuels. This paper presents the theoretical concepts and international
lessons considered during the design of the price and rate regulations to limit these areas ofmarket power. Benchmarkingis used to control Pernex
gas prices, while a sophisticated revenue cap rnethodology is ernployed to
regulate transportation and distribution rates. MI of these rnechanisms
provide incentives for productive efficiency, take care of allocative efli
ciency, and minimize the cost of regulation. The paper also points out
lessons from the policy design process and sorne ofthe potential pitfalls of
regulations as well.
Resumen: Después de la reforma reguladora en el sector del gas mexicano
la producción es aún un monopolio legal. El transporte y la distribución son
monopolios naturales. Las ventas de gas de los distribuidores a los consu
midores (principalmente residenciales) son potencialmente monopolísticas
cuando no existe competencia de comercializadores o de combustibles
sustitutos. Este documento presenta conceptos teóricos y lecciones inter
nacionales considerados durante el diseño de la regulación de precios y tarifas. Para regular los precios del gas nacional se usa una referencia
internacional, mientras que para regular las tarifas de transporte y dis
tribución se emplea una metodología de ingreso máximo. Estos mecanis
mos promueven la eficiencia en la producción y en la asignación, y minimi zan los costos de la regulación. También se destacan las lecciones del
proceso de diseño de política así como algunos problemas potenciales de las
regulaciones.
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Introduction’
T
his paper describes the economic rationale ofthe new price and rate
regulations for the Mexican natural gas industry. These regula
tions are policy instruments ofthe regulatory reforms recently applied
to this industry. The reforms maintain the state’s monopoly over
production but allow private investment in transportation, storage and
distribution of natural gas. 2
The basic goal of the regulations is, of course, limiting market
power and fairly allocating monopolistic rents between monopolistic
firms and consumers. After regulatory reform ofthe natural gas sector in
Mexico, three main areas with market power remained: production (the
state owned company Petróleos Mexicanos [Pemexi legally maintained its
monopoly), transportation and distribution (activities with naturally mo
nopolistic characteristics), and distributor’s gas sales to captive customers.
The ways in which the price and rate regulations limit market
power are varied. While benchmarking is used to control Pemex gas
prices, a sophisticated revenue cap methodology was designed to
regulate transportation and distribution rates. However, all of the
mechanisms share the common feature ofbeing incentive regulations.
This paper presents the theoretical concepts and international
lessons that, from our point ofview, were considered in Mexico during
a policy making process immersed in rapidly changing events. The
paper is divided into four sections. In each section, the specific chal
lenges faced by regulatory policy are defined, the related theoretical
and empirical backgrounds are reviewed, and the policy decisions
taken are described and justified.
The first section explains how the national gas price is set by
considering fluctuations in the conditions of an international bench
mark market as well as changes in transportation costs. This meth
odology seeks to i) moderate the effects ofthe transition towards new
regulation, u) reproduce the conditions ofan international competitive
market, and iii) transparently reflect the impact of transportation
rates on the price of gas.
1 Suggcstions from Danna Contrato and Michael Klein are gratefully acknowledged. The
analyses and conclusions presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflectthe position of the Comisión Reguladora de Energía.
2 The basic legal framework which supported this reform was designed by the Comisión
Reguladora de Energía between April and October 1995. For a detailed description ofsuch reform
consult Rosellón (1995) and International Energy Agency (1996).
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The second section describes the regulation for transportation
and distribution rates. Ths methodology aims to prornote productive
efficiency through providing incentives for cost minimization. The
specific incentive scherne chosen by the Mexican regulatory authority
was “average revenue” regulation which provides greater rate-setting
flexibility than the “tariff basket” rnethodology. This flexibility is
necessary for the development of the new natural gas projects in
Mexico.
The mechanisrns used to assure that rates adequately reflect the
cost ofproviding service to different custorner types are also described
in section 2. A central goal ofthose mechanisms is to deter companies
frorn cross subsidizing arnong consumers.
Section 3 presents the implicit economic justifications for the
price rnethodologies designed to protect captive custorners frorn distri
bution companies. The paper concludes with sorne observations on the
experiences confronted in trying to apply theoretical and empirical
considerations in the design of a broad regulatory framework.
The main contribution ofthis paper is the application oftheoreti
cal concepts, together with international-experjence and political con
straints, so as to solve the real-world problems faced in the design of
price and rate regulations for the Mexican natural-gas industry.
Likewise, this paper also provides formal contributions such as:
• Optirnal regulation of the price charged by a rnonopoly of a
product whose marginal cost cannot be isolated has not been
subject of extensive analysis in the economics literature. The
analysis of the proper regulation of natural gas addresses this
problem, since more than 80% of gas produced in Mexico is a
joint product of oil. Contrary to the recomrnendations of the
theory ofregulation, that suggest that even incentive methodo
logies should include sorne reference to costs (see, for exarnple,
Arrnstrong, et al., 1994), this paper shows in section 1 that a
benchmarking rnethodology is preferable to any cost-based
method so as to regulate the price ofnational gas in Mexico.
• Literature shows that tariff basket regulation is superior to
average revenue regulation [see Bradley and Price (1989), Brad
ley and Price (1991), and Law (1995)]. This paper presents a
counterexample where average revenue might be better than
tariff basket regulation. Under a dynamic framework, with
variant levels of risk across time, the “firm risk-consumer
Juan Rosellón
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surplus” trade off may be such that it is preferable to use
average revenue to regulate prices, at least for a certain period
of time. More specifically, in the greenfleid gas distribution
projects ofMexico the handling offirms’ risk, and uncertainties
is more important than reductions in consumer surpius for the
first five-year period. Since average revenue provides more
flexibility in rate rebalancing, it is preferable to use this kind of
regulation during such a period and later change to tariff-bas
ket regulation in order to take care of long-run welfare issues.
1. National-Gas Price Regulation
Compared to other countries, Mexico is unusual in that its natural gas
production sector remains as a legal monopoly of Pernex by constitu
tional mandate. This being true even after the regulatory-reform
process carried out during 1995. Theory and practice suggest that the
market structure ofsuch a sector is potentially competitive or contest
able. 3 Therefore, regulation in Mexico had to do its best, within
applicable legal constraints, to design measures which replicate mar
ket conditions. One such measures was a formula which set a cap on
the price ofgas and promoted both productive and allocative efficiency.
The principal regulatory methods considered during development of
the price-cap formula for domestic natural gas were:
• Pricing based on costs at the wellhead. This would be a pass
through mechanism, allowing Pemex to transfer to consumers
the costs ofgas acquisitions.
• Comparisons with other fuels’ prices on a netback basis.
• Pricing based on a benchmark such as the price ofimported gas
at the border. Alternatively, a reference hub could be used as
benchmark. This hub should reflect conditions of a competitive
market, possess characteristics ofliquidity (which makes it less
vulnerable to price manipulation), and have an associatedhedg
ing market.
Before studying the reasons for the policy decision taken, we wiIl
first review the related basic policy framework and the relevant
international experiences.
1.2. Objectives ofRegulation
Reasons for regulating the price of the product of a monopoly such as
Pemex are well known. Theory and practice confirm that non-regu
lated monopolies may not have incentives for cost reduction nor for
product innovation. This can result in productive inefficiency which
does not promote quality improvement ofgocds. Likewise, a monopo
list rnay set a markup between prices and marginal cost with no
relation to consumer welfare and thereby creating inefficient resource
allocation. The evils of an unregulated monopolistic firm are more
evident in markets where consumers have a low elasticit,y ofdemand.
Such firrn may establish prices much greater than marginal cost and
generate inefficiencies in resource allocation.
The state-of-the-art rationale for regulating a firm with market
power is provided by the theory of the economics of regulation. This
theory — which is the public econornics face of the new theory of
industrial organization [as synthesized in writings such as Tirole
(1988)1 — analyzes interactions among economic agents in conditions
ofimperfect information. According to the economics ofregulation, the
structure of the relationship between a regulatory agency and a
regulated firm is isomorphic to the “principal-agent” paradigm. In
this model, a government agency (the principal) seeks to regulate a
firm (the agent) which has market power and private information,
both endogenous and exogenous, not available to the agency. In other
words, both “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” phenomena are
present in the principal-agent relationship. The agent manipulates
such information so as to maximize his benefits and evade actions of
the principal.
In this context, the regulator’s rnission is to make the agent
Arrnstrongetal. (1994), p. 246.
Laffont and Tirole (1993).




behave competitiveiy while simultaneousiy redistributing monopo
iistic rents and reducing uncertainty and risk in the econorny. Optimal
reguiation can be achieved by a mechanism in which the regulator
offers a transfer function and the regulated firm selects itself by
choosing a cost leve!. Through this mechanism, the firm wi!l reveal its
true leve! of efficiency (which is represented by an adverse-selection
parameter í3 known only to the firrn) and, at the optimum, wiil behave
according to such a level. The “reve!ation principie” states that any
optimal method of regulating a firm is equivalent to a reveiation
mechanism. In the absence of transfers, incentives for reveiation of
the true level of efficiency are provided by a second-best instrument
such as prices. 6
The role of the regulator is even more important in energy
infrastructure sectors. This being true since the behavior ofan unregu
lated natural monopoly in the energy sector may have consequences
on the conditions of a whole economy. Lack of efficiency in the produc
tion and exploitation ofenergy affects an economy in several ways: i) it
may have immediate effects on those sectors directly linked to the
energy sector, ji) it may increase the cost of the energy inputs de
manded by any firm, and iii) it may undercut the benefits ofderegu
lation in other sectors. For example, a monopoiist may ration its supply
of certain fuel, causing a nationwide fuel use pattern different from
that which wou!d be consistent with productive, technical and alloca
tive efficiency.
Besides being a monopoly, Pernex is also a state enterprise. With
respect to ownership of monopolies, theory states that incentives of
private and state monopolies rnay not be the same. A state monopoly
may manipulate its supply not only to increase its profits, but also to
expand its scope of control. However, irrespective of ownership, both
theory and practice suggest that regulatory policy must focus on
recognizing different market structures, regulating market power and
eliminating barriers to entry in potentially competitive markets. Re
gimes of competition and regulation in which an industry operates
seem to be crucial in determining the consequences of ownership.
Finally, the theory ofthe economics ofregulation also emphasizes
that promotion of competition only makes sense in contestable mar
kets. In absence of market power, there is no economic-efficiency
6 Laffont (1994), pp. 5 13-521.
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reason for regulating prices or market entry. Therefore, regulatory
policy seeks to combine: introduction of regulation to prevent a
(natural or legal) monopolist frorn arbitrarilymanipulatingprices, and u) elimination of artificial entry barriers and creation of public infor
mation in potentially competitive rnarkets.
1.3. Gas Pricing: International Experience
Pricing of natural gas is determined by the market in several coun
tries. For example, in the United States (U. S.) and in several Euro-
pean countries, wellhead prices reflect competition in the market for
gas production. An intense rnarketing activity occurs in these coun
tries, ensuring best price conditions for consumers.
In the case ofthe United Kingdom, gas prices resuit from compe
tition among producers for contracts. 7 Such contracts were usually
arranged with a single purchaser, British Gas, which was able to
obtain low prices and longer terms due to its monopsonistic power.
Later, with the arrival of competition, contracts were sought and
arranged through several purchasers.8
Negotiations between buyers and sellers determine gas prices in
most of continental Europe (for instance France and Germany). Con
tracts are usuaily with national gas companies in the cases of Statoii
(Norway), Sonatrach (Algeria) and Gazprom (Russia). In OECD coun
tries, there are two main principies for natural gas pricing: in sorne
countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden
and Denmark) gas prices are set according to prices of substitutes,
whiie in others are set according to cost. 9 Countries like Belgium,
France, United Kingdom and Italy use a mix of the two principies,
while the price of imported gas is set in countries like Japan and the
United States by adding the price at the border plus costs oftranspor
tation, distribution and storage.
1
Britsh Petroleum, Shell, Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Exxon are examples of companies which compete with British Gas in the production of natural gas. However, British Gas has remained as a main producer. For example, in March 1992 the three largest producers in the United Kingdom Continental Shelfwere British Gas with a share of 18.7%, iw with 14.9% and Shell-Exxon with 21.6% (Ofgas, 1993).
8 The legal monopoly ofBritish Gas was restricted to consumers ofless than 2 500 therms per year. Starting 1998, full competition for domestic gas will be allowed.
International Energy Agency (1991).
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1.4. Policy Decisions
The policy decisionregardingpricing ofdomestic natural gas in Mexico
took into consideration both theoretical and international-experience
backgrounds. Among the possible options considered, the cost-of-pro
duction method was not foflowed since most of the gas produced in
Mexico is a byproduct of oii extraction. That is, there is no marginal
cost of producing Mexican natural gas alone since this product is a
joint product of oil. Therefore, there is no way of comparing the
marginal cost of producing natural gas with its marginal product.
Further, basing the maximum price of Mexican natural gas on
cost would have not reflected the market value of the product, and,
therefore, market distortions would have been created since the natu
ral arbitration among North American markets would have been
impeded:
• Pemex would have not been able to obtain the margin between
its price ofgas and that ofthe North American gas market.
• Natural gas from the United States and Canada would rarely
have flown to Mexico.
The second option, methodology of comparison with other fuels’
prices, was also not a very attractive option given Mexico’s circum
stances. The reasons for this are that the possible natural gas substi
tutes are either:
• Somewhat cost reflective but, in some cases, subsidized in ways
that are not explicit,’° or
• Reflective of prices in international markets wíth dynamics
different from the Mexican natural gas market, which is closely
linked to the behavior ofthe larger North American market.
Therefore, linking the price ofnatural gas to the price of substi
tutes would have meant transmitting distortions of noncompetitive
markets to the natural gas market or ignoring the economic linkage
ofthis market to the North American natural gas market.
The third option of gas-price regulation compares the perform
ance of regulated companies with that ofsimilar firms in comparable
274
10 Such as high-sulfur fuel oil or liquid petroleum gas (LPG).
settings. This proved to be the best option for Mexico for several
reasons. First, such a methodology takes into account the opportunity
cost of the Mexican gas with respect to the North American market,
one of the largest and most competitive in the world. Second, since
Mexico is close to this market finding a relevant benchmark was a
feasible task. The designed regulatory formula takes as a benchmark
the dynamic behavior of a hub located in the South of Texas. This
hub, the “Houston Ship Channel,” satisfies three fundamental char
acteristics:
• It is a liquid market, which assures that the benchmark price
is neither subject to manipulation, nor influenced by Mexico’s
gas trade balance.
• It has an associated hedging market, which enables gas mar
keters to reduce price volatility to their customers.
• It is very close to the South Texas area which has a physical
connection to the Pemex pipeline system.” Therefore, Houston
Ship Channel is a better selection for a hub relevant to the
economics ofthe Mexican gas market than, say, a hub or a set
ofhubs in regions ofNorth America not physically linked to the
Mexican market.’ 2
Second, the benchmarking methodology was not so different from
the netback methodology that Pemex had previously used. 13 In
fact, the new regulatory formula uses the price charged by Pemex in
March 1996 as its initial startingpoint. This is a very desirable feature
since the transition to the use ofthe new formula will not create a large
jump in prices for consumers.
The application of the benchmarking methodology to determine
the price cap for domestic gas resulted in the formula:’
11 Texas Eastern Transmission (Tetco) and Valero Transmjssion (Valero) are the South
Texas pipes which have a physical connection to the Pemex network. A historical price differen
tial between Tetco and Valero and Houston Ship Channel of .07 USD was calculated by the
Comisión Reguladora de Energía for the price and rate regulations.
‘ 2 Following this argument, the suggestion ofSwydan (1996) ofusing a weighted average
of prices from different trading U. S. gas centers would not have been adequate. 13 Pemex’ methodology takes the price ofnatural gas in the south ofTexas (more precisely,
an average of the Tetco and Valero prices) and adds the cost of transportation to Ciudad Pemex
in the South of Mexico.
14 More details regarding natural gas pricing in Mexico can be found in Comisión
Reguladora de Energía (1996), pp. 5, 6, 8-11. It must be pointed out, that gas price methodology
does not eliminate the agents’ possibilities of contracting gas prices under more favorable
conditions.
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VPM, = Price of domestic gas (or “first hand sales” price) at
time i;
B 0 = Pemex price for natural gas as of March 1, 1996
(initial price condition);
Houston Ship Channel price adjustment between
date i — 1 and date O, and
TP — TP 0 = Adjustment for changes in regulated transportation
rates in Mexico between date i — 1 and date O.
In this last subsection, we present sorne final reflections regarding the
nature ofthe national gas-price methodology as well as sorne of their
problems or possible pitfalls.
Domestic natural-gas price must be regulated, so as to ensure
allocative and distributive efficiency, since the production of this
product is a legal monopoly of Pemex. The methodology designed for
setting the price of natural gas takes as benchmark a South-Texas
price and adds cost of transportation from this region to South-East
Mexico, where most ofthe associated natural gas is produced. In this
benchmark methodology, the last point where imported gas is con
sumed is defined as the arbitration point. The price ofMexican natural
gas is the price at the arbitration point less transport costs. The
arbitration point moves as the balance between imports and exports
of natural gas changes. This point moves North (South)as imports
decreases (increases). In practice, due to administrative reasons, the
arbitration point moves in a discrete fashion rather than continu
ously.
The main attractive feature ofthis method is that the cost ofthe
marginal imported gas and the marginal cost of the Mexican gas is
the same at the arbitration point. However, as imports increase the
arbitration point moves South increasing the cost ofMexican natural
gas more than the marginal cost oftransport. Moreover, even though
linking the U. 5. and Mexican natural gas prices introduces into the
Mexican market competition frorn the U. S. market, it also brings to
the Mexican market the disturbance generated by the U. 5. weather.
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Abrupt changes in the U. S. weather may originate that Mexican
consumers end up paying for externalities that apparently have no
relation with them. For example, during the winter of 1996 customers
in Mexico City saw a dramatic increase in their natural gas bilis due
to a very coid winter in the North East of the United States.’
A careful analysis ofthe economics ofnatural gas production and
pricing shows that Pemex natural gas’s profit-maximizing problem is
not typical since:
• Supply of natural gas is determined by the supply of oil. The
production of natural gas does not really reacts to any change
in price or demand.
• The location of the arbitration point is a function of the import
balance. Since supply is exogenously given (at least in the short
run), this rneans that the price of Mexican natural gas is
basically driven by domestic and international demand.
• Domestic natural gas profits are mainly determined by the
international and national dernand faced.
In other words, even though Pemex is a monopolist in the produc
tion of dornestic gas, this company does not have a textbook profit
maximizing problem: Pemex does not decide natural gas production,
allocation and price ofdomestic natural gas by equating marginal cost
and marginal revenues.
The main question regarding the natural-gas pricing methodol
ogy used in fvlexico is regarding its implications on overali efficiency.
This seems to be a problem in the theory of the second best. Two
equilibrium conditions have to be satisfied for efficiency: spatial and
intertemporal conditions. In the spatial market, the price of natural
gas must be linked to transport costs while in the intertemporal
market the price of natural gas at any two points in time should be
linked by the interest rate and the cost of holding natural gas.
When the intertemporal equilibrium condition is violated, is it
sensible to impose the first condition? In other words, does it make
sense to reach an spatial equilibrium even at the cost of causing
intertemporal distortions? Having the price ofnatural gas reflect the
cost of importation means that the marginal gas will be used effi
where:
VPM=B 0 + [HSC1 -HSCO] + [TP—TF 0 1
HSC 1 —HSC 0 =
1.5. Other Considerations and Froblems
15 Natural gas price in Mexico increased 135% betwcen October 1996 and January 1997.
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ciently, but imputing this price to domestic production results in rents
to Pernex and may create intertemporal distortions such as a wrong
selection of technology over time. In other words, the spatial equilib
rium (first best solution) does not seem to imply an intertemporal
equilibrium due to transport network restrictions. Therefore, a sec
ond-best solution rnay need to be found. A possibility would be to use
sorne forrn of non-linear price schedule. For example, the non-linear
methodology rnay consist of a (possibly non-homogeneous) two-part
tariff. One part would be based on historical average or the summer
US price ofgas. The other part would be a variable charge of, say, 20%
of the cost of importation. A second best solution, such as a two-part
tariff, would reflect gas’ long-term opportunity cost. Natural gas would
be priced in terrns of its scarcity and not in terrns of pipeline bottle
necks.1 6
2. Transportation and Distribution Rate Regulation
Transportation and distribution services have naturally monopolistic
characteristics. This rnarket failure justifies regulatory intervention to
limit rnarketpower.’ 7 The challenge for Mexican regulationwas to design
adequate transportation and distribution rate methodologies which also
provided incentives for productive and allocative efficiency, and incorpo
rated recent international rate-setting trends and developments.
2.1. Policy Options
In the rate design process for transportation and distributidn services,
the Mexican regulatory authority had to take two basic decisions.
16 Brito and Rosellón (1998) carry out a deeper analysis of the implications of the
regulation ofnatural gas price in Mexico. In this analysis, they study the specific intertemporal
distortions in technology selection caused by the methodology to a firm that uses natural gas as
an input as opposed to other substitutes such as fuel oil or diesel. In this paper, they also work
out a formal model that shows that the netback methodology results from solving an optimization
problem and that permits several complications such as several production fields, investment
decisions among fields, public policy and technical restrictions in foreigri trade, and so forth. Also
consult Brito, Littlejohn and Rosellón (1998) for a formal analysis of the methodology used in
Mexico to regulate the price of liquid petroleum gas which is an important substitute ofnatural
gas at the residential level.
‘ International Energy Agency (1994), pp. 69-70.
First, it had to decide whether to use cost of service or incentive
regulation. Ifincentive reg’ulation were chosen, a second decision had
to do with the kind of incentive regulation that would be appropriate
for the Mexican natural gas industry. Here the options considered
were price cap regulation via fixed weights and average revenue
regulation.
As before, we will first review the pertinent elements of theory
and international experience before explaining the specific policy
decisions taken.
2.2. Theoretical Background
Cost of Service us. Price Cap Regulation
Cost of service regulation implies setting prices equal to average cost
so that price setting is the result of equating total revenues and total
costs. This kind of regulation usually goes along a restriction on the
rate of return on capital to restrain monopoly power. Under this
regime, prices remain fixed until sorne agent (regulators, consumers
or firms) asks for a modification of prices in a public hearing.
Cost of service regulation has been subject to several criticisms.
First, since the regulated firm usually produces other non-regulated
products, cross subsidization is always a potential risk. Second, rate
of return calculations are inherently less than objective, given the
general vagueness in determining what is a fair return necessary to
attract capital to a venture and the range of pararneters applied.
Third, under cost of service, incentives for cost minimization are
almost nonexistent since the complete restitution of costs does not
promote monetary expenditures for the improvement of efficiency.’
Fourth, cost of service really lacks of any theoretical framework.
Nonetheless, cost of service also has a basic advantage in that it
provides certainty and a long run commitment of the governing
However, there is not a complete agreement regarding incentives for quality under cost
of service. On one hand, the lack of incentives for cost minimization could also imply lack of
incentives for quality improvements. On the other hand, cost passthroughs and returns on
investments in quality plant and equipment may be recovered under cost of service producing
results such as “Apollo englneering” or “gold plating” because of the relative ease of recovery of
such investments (witness the U. S. nuclear generation industry)
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authority. These two elements are very important for the typical long
run investments needed in utilities.
As an alternative to cost of service regulation, different schemes
have been designed and applied in several countries for varied indus
tries. Such schemes seek to promote efficiency by providing incentives
for cost minimization. Examples ofincentive schemes are benchmark
ing, yardstick competition and price caps.
Price cap regulation in its purest abstract form does not have to
be based on costs, and, therefore, does not make explicit use of
accounting data. Under this regime, the regulatory authority sets
ceiling prices for either al! goods or a basket of goods. In its purest
form, price cap regulation is unlikely to be optimal since the lack of
cost reflectiveness makes it very improbable that, in the case of no
government transfers, the regulator will target the optirnal difference
between price and marginal cost. Too low a cap could violate the
“individual rationality” constraint ofthe firm° and elicit a disincentive
for firms to produce since they cannot get a minimum level of profits.
Too high a cap could permit a monopolist to continue to enjoy excessive
profits at the consumers’ expense.
Therefore, the kind of price cap regulation used in practice is
combined with cost of service exercises performed at the end of fixed
periods (usually offour or five years) and incorporates adjustments for
inflation and efficiency during such periods. In fact, there are theoreti
cal models which determine the optimal level of cost passthrough for
a price rule which combines elements of price cap and cost of service
regulation. 2 ° The results of such modeis show that: i) a pure price cap
would be optimal when the firm is risk neutral or when there is no
uncertainty about costs, and ji) cost-of-service rules are adequate
when the firm is risk averse and when there is more cost uñéertainty.
Therefore, when applying incentive schemes, regulators consider
issues also faced in cost of service regirnes such as: level ofcapital stock,
depreciation, “fair” and “reasonable” rates of return, expected rates of
growth ofproductivity and demand, and level ofinvestments. However,
the main differences between such applied incentive schemes and the
cost of service method are that incentive schemes: i) have a more for
ward-lookingphilosophy, and u) are characterized by periods in between
regulatory reviews which are meant to be exogenous.
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‘ Which requires a non-negative firm’s utility level.
‘ See, for example. Milgrom and Roberts (1992, ch. 7.
Natural Monopoly Regulation and Ramsey Pricing
Regarding regulation of a firm operating in an industry with natural
monopoly conditions or, in other words, with a subadditive cost tech
nology, 2 ’ basic economic theory states that marginal cost pricing is not
advisable. This is true because marginal cost pricing would not allow a
firm to recover its fixed costs unless the loss in profits is covered by the
government through a direct subsidy. Then, a pricing rule yielding
revenues which permit a firm to recover its costs must set a price greater
than marginal cost. But, the question here is: how much greater?
A rule for the optimal difference between prices and marginal cost
is provided by the Ramsey equation. A general form of this equation
can be obtained from solving, under conditions of asymmetric infor
mation, the program which maximizes the expected social welfare 22
subject to incentive and individual rationality constraints ofthe firm.
Under certain conditions, 23 the solution to this prograrn provides the




where P. is the price of product i, C is the marginal cost ofproducing
product i, X is the social cost ofpublic funds, and T L is the (super)elas
ticity of demand ofproduct
j•24




for any set of outputs Qi Q,. In words, this condition means that an industry is a natural
monopoly if a single firrn can produce a set of outputs at a lower cost than several firms, each
having the same cost function.
Most of the literature of regulatory econornics defines social welfare as the sum of
consurner surpius plus a fraction (between O and 1) of the firm’s surplus. The “benevolent
regulator assumption” supposes that regulators have a tendencv to give more weight to consumer
surplusthan te firm surplus (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, pp. 3S-39).
23 Independent consumer demands and rents from asymrnctric information unaffected by
the change in outputs.
24 Laffont (1994), pp 5 13-520, presents the generalized version of the program abose
solution derives in Ranisey-Boiteux prlclng.
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Tariff-Basket vs. Average Revenue
There are different forms of price cap regulation. Two well known
variations are: “regulation with fixed weights” (or tariff-basket regu
lation) and “average revenue regulation”. Under tariff-basket regula
tion, a cap is set over the weighted sum of prices of the different
products. More precisely, the firrn faces a restriction in which an index
E Z P of its prices cannot be greater than the cap, but is otherwise
permitted to choose relative prices (where are fixed weights so that
E 1). The set of prices actually charged will depend on the
characteristics of the index and the firm’s cost function. That is, the
firm will find a set ofprices which maximize
where fl(P) is the profit ofthe firm.
Under the tariff-basket regime, weights assigned to each price
typically depend on known dernands for each product. That is, if
Q (P) are known demands for sorne vector of prices P, weights are
defined as = Q 1 (P). Therefore, under this tariff-basket tegime the
firm is allowed to select any vector of prices P which satisfies:
() Qi()}
The dynamic version of the tariff-basket mechanisrn establishes the
fixed weights ofeach period based on previous period’s outputs. More
specifically, the firm is allowed to choose a set of prices Pt in period t
so that:
Ql t - 1 :ti
Qt1}
Therefore, weights are endogenous over time since one period’s prices
set next period’s weights.
The tariff-basket mechanisrn has several theoretically positive
features that include:
• A firm which maximizes the net present value of its profits
subject to (1) will choose a price vector which satisfy Ramsey
pricing conditions. 25
• It has an unambiguously positive effect on welfare (in particu
lar, on consumer surpius) compared to a regime which fixes
prices at a certain level.
• It will promote productive efficiency, optimal efforts and mini-
mal wasteful expenditures.
However, the fixed-weight form of regulation has a basic draw
back which has to do with flexibility. Since weights are fixed, changes
in prices which are not congruent with the fixed weights chosen will
not be allowed. This puts an enormous burden on regulators, especially
in cases of bids for new projects where winners are selected based on
proposed minimurn prices. In such cases, regulators must be suffi
ciently capable to arbitrarily choose weights — sometimes without
reliable information — which will remain fixed irrespective of the
unexpected events that rnay occur during development ofthe project.
In practice, a modified version ofthe tariff-basket mechanism is
mainly used in telecommunications. The modification incorporates




where RPI is the factor for inflation adjustments and X is the factor
which measures efficiency improvernents.
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tion which sets a cap P on a firm’s revenues per unit; that is, the firm
is permitted to choose any price vector from:
{PQ(P)F Q(P)}
Under this scheme demand for information is not too harsh since the
price index weights are endogenous to the firm because they depend
on chosen prices. According to Armstrong et al. (1994), average reve
nue regulation is rnost adequate for firms whose costs depend on total
output and whose products are commensurable. 26
Another feature of this kind of regulation is that relative prices
ofdifferent products may vary as long as the average revenue obtained
is below the average revenue cap. Even more, total revenues and rates
of return can be as high as possible as long as they comply with the
cap. Usually, there can be rnany sets ofrelative prices that are optimal.
A firm will choose that set which is most adequate to the technological
and market characteristics of its project given a certain level of
risk and uncertainty. In case of eventualities, the firm would be able
to choose another set ofrelative prices as long as the average revenue
obtained is less than the cap. Since weights are not fixed, flexibility
for changing relative prices is greater in average revenue than in
tariff-basket regulation.
Nevertheless, theory states that average revenue regulation has
one essential problem. Typically, a firrn establishes a set ofprices such
that total revenue is maximized subject to a constraint on total output.
When cross elasticities of dernand are zero, it can be shown that the
optimal price for product i satisfies:
¿ \1Ej
26 Goods produced by a rnultiproduct firm are said to be commensurable if they are
produced with a technology characterized by:
C(Q Q,,) = c
where C is the cost function and Q is the ith product for i = 1, 2, .., n.
whereis constant and c is the elasticity of demand of product i. In
case < i, then> O, whiéh implies prices are directly proportional to
elasticity ofdemand. This contradicts the Ramsey rule.27
As in the case of fixed-weight regulation, a “lagged” average
revenue scheme is used in the dynamic context. 28 The constraint is that
price vectors in period t he in the set:
Q 1 t -’ (RPI -X)
Qt1}
where P is the average-revenue cap for each period t.
In case of”greenfielcl” projects, where data from previous periods
is unknown, total output in period t, Q must be used. However, such
output is not usually known until the end of the period, while prices
must be set at the start of the period. Therefore, the regulated
firrn must forecast Q at the beginning of the year, and a correction
factor must be applied at the end of the year to correct for wrong
estimation of output.
2.3. International Experience on Incentive Regulation
Price cap mechanisms have been adopted for regulation in natural gas
industries in sorne countries such as Argentina, the United Kingdorn
and the United States. In Argentina, an RPI-Xprice cap methodology
is used to regulate rates for transportation and distribution ofnatural
gas. However, instead ofusing a retail price index for inflation adjust
ments, Argentineans use the United States producer price index. Also,
an X efficiency factor is used. This factor has a value of zero for the
first five years of a project.
In the United Kingdom, adjustable price caps are used to regulate
British Gas (BG) as to custorners that consume less than 25 thousand
therms per year. The adjustment forrnula includes the retail price
index (RPI), the gas price index (GPI), X factors for both gas and
non-gas costs, and an energy efficiency factor.
27 See on this issue Bradley and Price (1989), Bradley and Price (1991), and Law (1995). 28 A variant of this scheme has been used in the U. S. telecommunjcatjons’ industry.
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In California, sorne companies are now implementing perfor
mance-based rate making (PBR) programs and benchmark programs
so as to share benefits between shareholders and customers. The PBR
programs are similar to RPI-X schemes where rates are linked to
inflation and productivity indexes and also to a correction factor for
unexpected costs. These prograrns have also been implemented by
companies in other states in the United States.
Other industries have also adopted mechanisms to promote effl
ciency. For example, the Canadian National Energy Board has re
cently approved proposais for the implementation of “revenue cap”
regulation in the oil industry. Under this scheme, an initial “reason
able” revenue is established according to a cost of service exercise. If
the firm achieves certain cost reductions, additional profits are “so
cially reallocated,” and the allowed revenue cap for the next year is
reduced. This mechanism provides benefits for both consumers and
the firm when the latter increases efficiency.
Likewise, in the United States electric and telecommunications
industries there are many programs with incentive mechanisms. For
example, the Illinois Power Company implemented a rate setting
method based on a benchmark index of 23 other utilities. Similar
measures have been implemented for electric companies in California.
Tariff-basket methods have been applied by several U. S. telecommu
nications companies.
Also, incentive programs have been designed along with privati
zation programs. In Great Britain’s telecommunications industry pri
vatization occurred together with implementation of a revenue-cap
methodology.
2.4. Policy Decisions
Cost of Service or Incentive Regulation?
With respect to the decision between using traditional cost-of-service
or incentive regulation, it rnust be said that cost of service initially
seemed to be an appealing option for policy rnakers in Mexico. This
was due to the two following reasons:
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• Many ofthe natural gas projects would be greenfield enterpri
ses, characterized by long term investments with a relatively
high degree of risk and uncertainty. Therefore, the cost-plus
nature ofcost ofsefvice regulation would reduce uncertainty for
these investments, and
Since cost of service regulation is widely used in the United
States and Canada, its application in Mexico could in sorne ways
promote integration ofNorth American markets.
However, pure cost of service regulation was not chosen princi
pally because it has disincentives for utilities to be more efficient, cut
costs, be innovative, and take appropriate risks. Moreover, this kind
of regulation entails a very large regulatory burden on regulatory
commissions. Additionally, there is an international tendency to sub
stitute cost of service regulation for incentive mechanisms to regulate
utilities. This is the case even in countries, like the United States and
Canada, which have a long tradition of cost of service regulation.
Unlike cost ofservice, incentive schemes promote productive and
allocative efficiency, cost reduction, and innovation. Further, they
provide a mechanism to distribute monopolisticrents between the firm
and consumers and permit light-handed regulatory intervention. Nev
ertheless, even though incentive regulation was selected, the specific
final choice was a combination ofprice cap and cost ofservice regula
tion. At the beginning of every five-year period, a price cap will be
determined through a cost of service. This initial value will remain
fixed and will only be adjusted duringthe period by inflation, efficiency
and correction factors. This methodology builds upon the central and
important virtues of both cost of service and price cap regulation,
namely:
• It limits risks and perrnits efficient business to earn an appro
priate return.
• It provides incentives for efficient development and operation.
• It protects customers from abuses ofmarket power while simul
taneously recognizing the firm’s need to obtain adequate profits
(individual rationality constraint).
• Since it combines cost of service with incentive regulation, it
does not represent a great departure from practices followed in
other North American countries. 29
29 And, as mentioned before, it follows the tendency ah over North America of moving towards incentive methodologies.
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• It entails relatively light regulatory intervention which reduces
regulatory costs.
• It provides incentives to increase throughput.
Tariff-Basket or Average-Revenue Regulation?
Once the type of incentive methodology to be used was chosen, the
specific form of price cap had to be selected. Would it be a cap on
the price of each single service or on a basket of services? Would it
regulate prices directly or indirectly? This decision had to consider
state-of-the-art elements of economic theory, experiences of other
countries and industries, and the particular characteristics of the
Mexican natural gas industry.
Transportation and distribution services in Mexico’s gas industry
are characterized by a nascent distributioninfrastructure and arather
well developed transmission network, with a need for new projects.
Therefore, price regulation had to be designed to account for the fact
that it would be applied both to the existing Pemex facilities and to
the new greenfleid projects.
The Mexican regulatory authority decided to use average-reve
nue instead of a tariff-basket regulation. As argued before, average
revenue methodology grants more flexibility in rate rebalancing than
tariff-basket. Under average revenue, a firm choosesits relativeprices
given forecasts oftechnological and market characteristics, as well as
the level ofrisk and uncertainty. In case ofeventualities, such as costs
shocks or unexpected changes in market conditions, the firm will be
able to choose another set of relative prices as long as he average
revenue obtained is less than the cap. Flexibility for changing relative
prices is greater in average revenue than in tariff-basket regulation,
since weights are not fixed.
The specific average-revenue regulation for the Mexican natural
gas industry approves modifications in tariffschedules when they are
done in a uniform manner consistent with the revenue yield cap.
Likewise, rebalancing of relative rates are also approved by the
Regulatory Commission as long as these changes are consistent with
the average-revenue cap and they do not imply cross subsidization. 3 °
The election ofthis special kind of incentive rate regulation was done
See Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) (1996), articles 960 to 9.62, p. 34.
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in recognition of the revenue risks present when companies start a
new businesses. Flexibiliy to rebalance relative rates for different
types ofservices was thought necessary for the development ofthe gas
industry.
Furthermore, average revenue rate regulation was chosen since
most of the distribution permits would be granted through a bidding
process that would use rates as assigning criterion. If a five-year
fixed-weight method had been used, then either regulators or bidders
would have had to accurately calculate weights for different types of
users which would have remained fixed for at least five years. Since
most distribution projects are new ones, calculation of these relative
weights would have relied on forecasts rather than actual market
information regarding demands and costs. In case of abrupt changes
in the project, which made the estimated composition of consumers
obsolete, the tariff-basket method would have not permitted a change
in weights. Even though the average-revenue methodology is also
based on forecasts, the lack of fixed weights in such a methodology
provides more flexibility in managing a rate schedule so as to respond
to project’s sudden variations.
However, the concrete final form ofprice-cap methodology was a
combination oftariff-basket and average revenue regulation. Weights
for different types of users may be used in the calculation of the
average revenue cap once a first period offive years has elapsed.’ This
decision was taken recognizing the theoretical and practical advan
tages ofa fixed-weight methodology while, at the same time, consider
ing that a large amount of rate setting flexibility may be needed at
least during the first five years of development of a project.
The Average Revenue Formula
The application ofthe aboye described methodology to the determina
tion of distribution and transportation rates for the natural gas
industry in Mexico resulted in the following formula:
1
IM= [ 1+(n—X)I1OOJP 1 +Y,+K
31 See CRE (1996), article 6.12, p. 15.
(2)
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where
IM = Maximum average revenue per unit in year t;
P 1 = Initial maximum average revenue (P 0 ) adjusted by changes of
it — X




As mentioned aboye, this formula reflects a mix ofcost ofservice,
tariff-basket and average revenue regulation. Before the start of any
five-year period, 32 an initial maximum average revenue P 0 is deter
mined through a cost of service methodology. P 0 is then adjusted
during the period by inflation, efficiency, passthrough and correction
factors. As mentioned aboye, this particular regulation does not con
strain returns. An efficient business can keep ah achieved revenues
as long as they are not higher than the average-revenue cap.
The first five-year period has special characteristics in recogni
tion of the risks of starting new projects. During such period, the
correction factor is applied both when realized revenues are greater
than or smaller than the approved average-revenue cap. For distribu
tors, correction adjustments are only used in years four and sjx.
The inflation factor was designed to account for the peculiarities of
Mexico’s economy. For every operator,P 0 will be allowed to escalate in
Seo section CRE (1996), section 6.F, pp. 19-20.
une with an inflation index on an (at most) rnonthly basis. This index
is a weighted average ofConsurner Price Indices (cpi’s) of Mexico and
the United States, as applicable, and incorporates a factor which
corrects for fluctuations in the exchange rate. The index is based on
historic, ratherthan forecast movements in the Mexican and U. S. cri’s
and the peso/U. S. dollar exchange rate.
W’hen P 0 is set, the starting proportion for cost denominated in
pesos and in dollars will be defined so that the appropriate indices are
applied. Each permittee will have to gain approval from the regulatory
authority for the staring proportion which will remain fixed for a
period of five years.
The basic idea behind having a hybrid inflation factor is to
reduce exchange risk as opposed to using an index denominated in
a single currency. Formerly, regulatory authorities considered op
tions such as:
• Indexation in dollars using cii or a production price index (PPI).
• Indexation in pesos using Mexican cii or ii.
• An indexationwhich uses a number ofindices for different costs.
This last option was discarded due to its complexity and the lack
of sufficiently detailed Mexican indices to track peso costs. A combi
nation ofthe first two options seemed to be more appropriate:
• Since rnany of the existing Mexican operators have a large
proportion of their costs denorninated in pesos, it would have
been inappropriate to move entirely frorn peso to dollar indexa
tion since this would have increased their risk. Likewise, custo
mer risk would have increased since customer incornes are
denominated in pesos. Thus it appeared correct to index sorne
ofthe costs by a peso denominated factor.
• Also, sorne new investors will hikely want to obtain returns on
their investment in dollars and to reduce exchange risk by
having most capital costs indexed to dollars. Therefore, it seern
ed right to have sorne ofthe costs denominated in dohlars.
In developingthe indexation, a decisionhad to be taken as to what
kind of indices should be used. Since simplicity in application was
important, the decision was to use published indices instead of con







32 Periods between cost-of-service reviews represent a regulatory lag in which prices and
costs may diverge. The shorter the regulatory lag the more regulation tends to cost-of-service
regulation, the longer the lag the more incentives for efficiency. Qn one hand, too long lags may
not be desirable in volatile economies and may have negative effects on allocative efficiency (since
divergence between prices and costs could increase over time). Qn the other hand, too short lags
may be a constraint for productive efficiency. A regulatory lag offive years was chosen in Mexico
in accordance to the experience ofother countries applying price-cap schemes, such as Argentina
and United Kingdom.
For distributors that obtain their permit through a bidding process. Po will be determi
ned in the bid proposal. New transporters’ Po wiIl be set after evaluating costs, investment and
throughput projections for the f,rst five vears of operation. See CRE (1996), articles 6.19, 6.20,
p. 15.
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ppj should be used for the index. 3 For the peso cost, cpi was chosen
because this index was more likely to reflect the ability ofconsurners to
pay for service and was a reliable price indicator in Mexico. The US cii
was chosen because it was most compatible with the Mexican ci’i.
The Efficiency Factor
The X efficiency factor is an essential instrument in the incentive
scheme for natural gas regulation in Mexico. Through this factor,
rnonopolistic rents are distributed between consumers by means of
lowering the cap and, thus, encouraging allocative and productive
efficiencies. The X factor is designed to capture the difference between
the productivity irnprovement ofa particularfirm and the productivity
increase in a certain benchmark that, in sorne cases, is the average
productivity growth of all the firms in the industry.
The efficiency factor will be zero for the first five years ofopera
tion so as to provide companies which start a new project with
incentives to improve profitability and expand networks and through
put. Following international experience, the efficiency factor will be
set after the first five-year period based on expected efficiency gains
considering historic trends ofpermit-holders’ efficiency, international effi
ciency standards and benchrnarking with other perrnittees in Mexico.°
The Correction Factor
The K correction factor is required in the revenue cap formula to
enforce compliance with the cap. It is subtracted frorn the average
revenue cap in year t and will correct for mismatches between the cap
and achieved revenues in year t — 1. It will generally only apply
when the achieved revenue exceeds the cap. However, during the first
five years of service, the correction factor will also be added to the cap
when the permittee’s achieved revenue is less than the cap. This is to
provide permittees greater flexibility to rebalance rates during the
initial development period oftheir projects.
la Argentma, rutes are (lenominated in (Gllars and converted jato Argentinean Pesos.
Ratos are adjusted every six inonths using the US ‘er.
Tlritish Gas has set X = 2% 1987-1992), X 5% (i992-1994. and X= 4% 1994-1997).
Additionally, X = 0% on fixed charge for consurners of less than 5 000 therrns.
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The K factor is necessary since it is unlikely that in a given year
a firm will be able to ‘achieve an average revenue which exactly
matches the cap. This is true because the average revenue cap will
depend on forecasts of the mix of services, passthrough costs 7 and
throughput. As these variables are partly outside the control ofopera
tors, it will be very difficult to set rates so that achieved revenue
precisely matches the cap.
In order to calculate the correction factor for each year it will be
necessary to calculate the actual average revenue dividing total reve
nues frorn contract and regulated sales by total throughput. Revenues
earned from contract sales will be adjusted so that they reflect the
revenue which would have been earned if the services had been sold
at a regulated rate. Since rnost ofcontract sales will norrnally be rnade at
a per unit rate below the equivalent regulated rate, this adjustment
is done so as to prevent cross subsidies between different customer
classes. Without the adjustment, permitees could increase regulated
rates whenever there was an increase in the units soid by contract by
the allocation to regulated rates ofcosts ofproviding contract services.
Other Rate-Setting Methodologies
Once a decision regarding the specific form of regulation had been
taken, another decision had to do with how regulation would apply to
the way companies set rates for their various services. As noted, rate
regulation in Mexico grants firms with substantial flexibility to rebal
ance their relative rates. Therefore, additional regulation on rate
setting nlethodologles was required to ensure cost reflectiveness of
relative rates for different services, avoid cross subsidies and impede
reductions in consumer surpius.
The specific challenges regarding rate setting were:
A. Definition of an optimal allocation of fixed and variable costs
to transportation and distribution charges.
Passthrough costs jnclude the gas purchased and soid by transporters to balance the
svstem use due to operational losses. and the incremental cost changos to the domestic tax
regirne. For tho calculation ofthe average revenue cap, permittees wlll make an estimate oftheir
passthrough costs at the start of the year. At the end of tho year, the estimated and the
actual passthrough costs are compared and the necessary adjustrnents on the cap are performed
seo CRE 1996, articles 6.45, 6.47, p. 19).
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B. Design of specific methods to calculate capacity charges.
A. Allocation ofcosts to charges. With respect to the allocation of
costs to transportation and distribution charges, international prac
tice generally tends to allocate costs to a two-part tariffbased upon a
combination of charges for the maximum capacity used during the
year (capacity charge) and the volume supplied during the course of
the year (commodity charge).
Two-part tariffs are nonlinear tariffs which vary as quantity
changes. They are usually formed by a fixed charge, which does not
depend on quantity, and a variable charge per unit of quantity con
sumed. Under “ideal conditions,” 8 it can be shown that optimal two
part pricing involves setting the fixed charge equal to fixed cost and
the variable charge equal to marginal cost. In comparison to an
average-cost pricing methodology, the addition of a fixed charge for
the right to consume allows marginal price to come closer to marginal
cost and helps the firm to recover its fixed costs.
Under more realistic assumptions, with consumers having het
erogeneous preferences, it is optimal to offer a menu oftwo-part tariffs:
tariffs with a low (high) fixed charge and a high (low) variable charge
would be offered to consumers with low (high) consumption. 39 This is
due to the fact that offering identical two-part tariffs for all consumers,
disregarding their particular tastes, may cause some consumers to
stay out ofthe market.
The split between capacity and commodity charges depends on
how the capacity charge is calculated. Ifit is assumedthat the majority
of capital costs of a gas utility are determined by the capacity needed
to meet demand at its peak, virtually all fixed costs (which for gas
utilities constitute the majority ofcosts) can be attributed to capacity,
and only those (few) costs which vary with throughput could be
counted as “commodity”.
In practice, cost allocation between capacity and commodity
charges has varied at several places andtimes. 4 ° The main differences
have been related to the amount offixed costs allocated to the capacity
38 One-product world, free flow of information (so that regulators are as well informed as
firrnsl, and consumers hornogeneous in their preferences.
See Armstrong et al. (1994), pp. 20-24, 53-54.
40 For instance, in the United States cost allocation to charges has varied from an “Atlantic
Seaboard” method which assigned 50% (later 100%) of fixed costs to the commodity charge, to
the “Straight Fixed Variable” method which allocates ah fixed costs to the capacity charge.
and the commodity charges so as to attain one or more policy objec
tives. For example, the more fixed costs are allocated to the commodity
variable charge, the more a firm depends on throughput to recover its
long run investment. Therefore, a policy which assigns more fixed
costs to the commodity charge generally has the effect of promoting
gas consumption.
Regulatory authorities in Mexico decided to allocate costs to
charges through a two-part tariff consisting of a capacity charge and
a commodity charge. This was done to enable charges to reflect the
fact that system costs depend upon when system use occurs, as well
as on how much gas is moved through the pipes.
Regarding the structure of two part tariffs, there were two sepa
rate decisions, one for distribution and another for transportation. For
transportation, the choice was a straight fixed variable methodology,
that is, transporters will be required to set capacity and commodity
charges to recover their fixed costs from capacity charges and their
variable costs from commoditycharges. This methodology is consistent
with the cost structure oftransportation businesses and with current
practices and interests of existing transporters and potential trans
portation investors. 4 ’ However, transporters are allowed to set a
different split between capacity and commodity charges if they can
demonstrate that it is consistent with the particular characteristics of
their projects.
On the other hand, distributors are required to set capacity and
throughput charges so that revenues from each recover 50 percent
oftotal costs. This methodology was designed differently from that of
transporters since regulators considered that peak capacity is a less
important cost driver in distribution than in transportation. In other
words, for distribution projects the number of consumers is a more
important cost driver than actual throughput. Also, since Mexican
distribution networks are scarcely developed, the 50-50 split was
thought to provide an incentive for development and for increas
ing throughput.
As in the case of transportation, distributors will be allowed to
recover more than 50 percent of their costs through capacity charges
ifthey are able to justify this in relation to their specific cost drivers.
41 In February, 1996, hearings with players of the gas industry took place so that the
Mexican regulatory authority could consider practical issues regarding price and rate method
ologies.
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B. Other Specific Methods. Recognizing the potential ability of a
company to dilute the stringency of the average revenue cap, several
other measures had to be established to ensurethat charges, especially
capacity charges, accurately reflected costs.
Sorne of these measures included decisions regarding methods
that must be used by permittees to calculate capacity use. These
rnethods had to encourage efficient systern use while avoiding uncer
tainty as to capacity payrnents which system users will have to make.
Policy decisions regarding capacity use and charging included:
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• Capacity payments must be based on capacity booked or reserved
in advance. This provides certainty to i) consumers with respect
to the capacity charges they will have to face, and u) transporters
and distributors regarding their revenues from capacity.
• Booking has to be made for the capacity required at the system
peak. This is preferable to consumers booking the maximurn
capacity they require (regardless of whether or not there is a
systern peak) because the timing of capacity requirements is
a major cost driver ofthe network system.
• Transportation users and unbundled distribution users (inclu
ding marketers) will be required to reserve peak systern capa
city. Distributors providing bundied service will be required to
reserve sufficient peak transportation capaeity and set suffi
cient peak distribution capacity.
• There will be a system of penahies for under booking at the
system peak which should give users an incentive to reserve the
correct arnount of capacity. Capacity reservations, penalty
arrangements and competition arnong perrnittees and market
ers will encourage the emergence of a secondarv rnarket for
capacit.y which will prornote the efficient use ofthe systern.
• The system peak vi11 be defined in advance by transporters and
distributors based on historie tirning and duration of the peak
load, or on cleemed customer class load profiles (when historic
data are not available or relevant for the system).
• Transportation capacity charges for different regions must be
based on marginal cost differences so that pricirig signais faci
litate the efficient developrnent of the system. Thus, transpor
tation charges will encourage the use of the svstem at points
where there is excess capacitv and discourage use where the
system is near fuli capacity.
• Distributors will be allowed to charge different rates for distinct
pressure tiers ofthe system, as there are genuine cost differen
ces associated with providing service at different pressures (due
to, for example, differentpipe diameters). Likewise, distributors
may charge different rates to different customer groups accord
ing to their distinct load profiles.
• Companies will be allowed to offer interruptible contracts. 42
Through these contracts, companies will be better able to stay
within their booked capacity and to overcome capacity const
raints. Interruptible rates must, ofcourse, be below the corres
ponding firm rate. 43
Flexibility of Regulation and Contract Sales
As mentioned aboye, rate regulation in Mexico is a combination of
several methodologies which provide a mix of certainty for invest
ments, incentives for efficiency and flexibility in rate setting:
• The cost ofservice performed at the beginning ofevery five-year
period provides enough certainty to firms’ projects since it
permits to passthrough their deemed fixed and variable costs of
their projects plus an adequate rate ofreturn.
• The incentive rnethodology used sets a cap on prices which
provides incentives for cost reduction and, therefore, forproduc
tive and allocative efficiency.
• The addition ofweights to the calculation ofthe cap — in order
to assess differences of providing service to distinct consumer
types —when projects have achieved maturity assures long-run
efficiency.
• The average revenue nature ofthe regulation permits flexibility
in the establishment of relative rates for different kinds of
services and consumers.
42 In sorne cases, the regulatory authority inayrequire interruptible contracts tobe offered;
for example, in cases when interruptible contracts may help to postpone investments intended
to overcorne capacity bottlenecks.
Economics of interruptible and firm rates can be analyzed under the Rarnsey frame
work. LetP and P, be the prices, Qf(Pf, P) and Q,(P, P) be the demands, and C and C, be the
marginal costs for firrn and interruptible services respectively. Optirnal price/marginal cost
markups are given by the Ramsey rule for each kind ofservice. Cris expected tobe substantially
greater than C, because supply ofan extra unit ofthe firrn service will require capacity expansion.
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This flexible regulation was designed to reduce risks in new
uncertain projects. However, the regulation also had to consider that
variable market conditions might demand different rate arrange
ments than the regulated ones. Therefore, rate regulation in Mexico
has another important virtue. As long as regulated rates exist as a
fallback, parties may freely contract for regulated services if they
follow sorne general requirements such as:
• Revenues frorn contract rates will be taken into account when
comparing permittees achieved average revenues with the cap,
since contract arrangements could be used by the market-power
ed firm to evade regulation.
• Contract sales will be deemed to have been rnade at the corres
ponding regulated rate so as to prevent cross subsidies between
contract and regulated sales.
• Contract rates must be equal to or greater than the minimum
rate. 44
There is another mechanism ofthe rate regulation whichprovides
flexibility in case ofunexpected economic circumstances. This mecha
nism adjusts the formula for calculating achieved revenues. In case of
a 10% volume drop in a certain year t due to causes beyond the control
of the firrn, this adjustrnent will limit the extent to which lower
throughputs inflate year t achieved revenue. Therefore, the K factor
will not adversely affect unduly the average revenue cap ofyear t + 1.
The adjustment to the achieved revenue will be made by using
i) 90 percent of the previous year’s throughput volume as denomina
tor, and u) actual contract revenues in the nurnerator. The first of
these adjustments limits the impact ofthroughput drops iii the calcu
lation of actual revenues. The second is required because contracts
may have been designed such that revenues are not tied to volume
throughput. In such a case, estimating contract revenues with regu
lated rates when volurne drops would overstate the operator’s true
revenues.
2.5. Other Considerations and Problems
The average revenue methodology (AB) designed for regulating rates
in Mexico is a price cap methodology. The main difference between
this methodology and the tariffbasket (TB) methodology is that under
TB the cap is set on an index 1(p) = w p. ,where w 1 are fixed weights
¿=1
while underAl? such weights are not fixed. Therefore, AR grants more
flexibility in the rebalancing ofrates than TB. It must also be pointed
out that AB methodology is not equivalent to a strict revenue cap
methodology. In particular, opposed to a revenue cap, AR does not
necessarily provide incentives for volume reduction.
As explained in subsection 2.4, AB was chosen to be used for
regulating transportation and distribution rates in Mexico due to the
high risks and uncertainties faced in projects where assets are scarce
or non existing (as in most greenfield distribution projects). Regulators
in Mexico considered that, at least for the first five-year period, the
handling of firms’ risk and uncertainties was more important — in
terms ofthe development ofprojects — than the possible reduction in
consumer surplus that theAR methodology could originate. However,
after the first five-year period, the firm risk-consurner surplus trade
off may change and, therefore, the inclusion of fixed weights may be
desirable. In other words, once a certain maturity in the development
of projects is reached the AR flexibility may be more detrimental for
consumers than beneficial for firms.
The flexibility granted by the AB rnethodology has limits. When
during a five-year period a company wants to make a change in the
relativity ofits rates, it mustjustify such change in terms ofmarginal
costs. This does not mean that another rate case will be opened during
the period and that a broad cost-of-service process will be performed
before five years. It only means that regulatorswant to make surethat
any rebalance in rates is justified in terms of the “other rate-setting
methodologies” enumerated in subsection
The minimum rate for a transportation or distribution service will be equal to the
corresponding commodity charge. When a transporter follow the regulated method ofcost allocation
to charges (that is the“straight fixedvariable”method)his minimum rate will be close to thevariable
charge ofproviding the service (see Comisión Reguladora de Energía, 1996, ch. 11).
These methodologies include:
1. Methods to allocate cost to charges;
2. Calculation of different capacity charges for different regions;
3. Different distribution rates for different delivery pressures;
4. Interruptible charging, and
5. Contract ratee.
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As it might be expected, another characteristic ofAl? is that it is
very sensitive to changes in different kinds of outputs. However, the
effect ofa change in the amount produced ofa certain output Q 1 on Al?
will depend on relative prices. For instance, when there are only three
types of consumers residential, commercial and industrial — AR
can be defined as:
where:
Q:
Q = Q, + Q + Q:
Al?
PQ + PQ +
Qr + Q +
QL
P: rates for different types of consumers (j = residen
tial, commercial and industrial);
throughput for different types ofconsumers; and
total throughput.





— Pr) + Q (P P)
(Q,--Q-i-Q 1 ) 2
This expression is negative ifP > P 1 and P > P. Sirnilarly, it can be
shown that O whenever Pr > P and P,. > P. Therefore Al?
decreases as industrial volume Q grows, and increases as residential
volume Qr rises, as long as P,.> P > P.
The sensitivity ofAl? to industrial volume may have implications
over the bidding processes for exclusivity of natural gas distribution.
During such processes, bidders have a tendency to overestimate in
their projects growth in industrial consumption in order to obtain the
lowest initial AB which allows them to win the bid. Regulators must
therefore be able to detect perverse bidding proposais which inflate
volume only with the purpose ofwinning exclusivity with the hope of
having a later renegotiation in rates.
3. Acquisition Pricing
Mexican regulatory authorities decided to prornote the development
ofdistribution systems by allowing temporary regional monopolies in
distinct geographic zones. These zones will be bid, and the winner will
generally enjoy an exclusive franchise period of 12 years in which he
will be the only party allowed to provide gas transmission service
inside his zone. The exclusivity is a principal reason why this service is
regulated by the methodology described in section 2 oftnis document.
However, marketing of the gas commodity inside a distribution
geographic zone constitutes a contestable market where distributor’s
gas sales compete with those from marketing companies. Therefore,
when there are enough players in such a market, a primary role of
regulation isjust to assure that there are no artificial barriers to entry
which hinder competition.
Under special circumstances, if there are not enough marketers
or substitute fuels competition in the gas sales market may be scarce.
Therefore, the company holding the distribution franchise might be
the only supplier for a group of captive custorners. Consequently,
regulation in Mexico had to devise a rnechanism to protect captive
customers in geographic zones where the distributor is the only seller
ofgas. 46
3.1. Policy Options
Three options were considered to regulate the maximum price that
can be passed through to the final user by the distributor resulting
from costs ofgas acquisitions, and transportation and storage services.
The methods initially considered were:
These methodologies are part ofthe cost ofservice performed every five years. Howevor, method
ologies 2 and 3 may also be applied during the five-year period when companies wish to make a
rebalance in their rates for different services. These methodologies require that relativities in rates
reflect relativities in marginal costs.
46 However. it must be stressed that lack of competition with other fucls in the gas sales
market vill only occur under very special circumstances. In Mexico, those custorners with a
potentiality tobe captive are the residentials ones. Such customers aro in general LPÍ consumers.
Customers which vill hayo to substitute their fuel consurnption towards natural gas (due to
environmental laws) are too large in terrns of market powet so as to be potentially captive.
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• A simple mechanism allowing the distributor to passthrough its
procurement costs of gas.
• A yardstick basis for passing through the cost of gas based on
the average cost ofgas for ah distributors.
• A variation or combination ofthese two methods.
We will proceed later on to analyze thejustifications for the final
decision. First, a review of relevant antecedents will be performed.
3.2. Cost Passthrough, Incentives and Risk
A distribution franchisee must seek to have a balance between risk
and incentive in its gas marketing activities. On one hand, the dis
tributor would like to recover ah ofits gas procurement costs (consist
ing of gas purchasing, storage and transportation expenses) due to
high risks involved in distribution projects. On the other hand, ifthere
are no incentives to acquire gas efficiently, distributors will not seek
to purchase gas cheaply unless they face competition from marketers
or from other fuels.
Related scenarios have been studied in sorne theoretical models.
For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) present a simple model
where the optimal level ofcost passthrough is calculated. The point of
the model is to find an optimal price rule ofthe forrn:
P(c) = P + (1 — p)c
where O p 1 is the pararneter which determines the level of cost
passthrough. The model shows that when the regulator minimizes the
expected payment to the firm subject to the firrn obtaining at least




where y is a parameter that measures the degree ofrisk aversion, and
a 2 reflects the amount of cost uncertainty. Therefore the more risk
averse the firm is and the more cost uncertainty there is in a project,
the more the price rule should permit passthrough of costs. At the
extreme, when y ora 2ar zero — meaningthat the firm is risk neutral
or that there is no cost uncertainty
— p = 1 and a pure price cap rule
would be optimal. As y or a 2 tend to infinity, the optimal pricing
policy would be cost of service. Ceteris paribus, the more risk averse
consumers are, the lower will be the optimal value of p.
In case the firrn produces more than one product, the aboye model




where O r 1 is a parameter which measures the degree ofcorrela
tion between the cost parameters of two firms. Therefore, the more
positive correlation there is between cost uncertainties of each firm,
the more aggregate uncertainty there is, and the higher the cost
passthrough that must be ahlowed to each firm.
3.3. International Experience
In Argentina, tariffs for natural gas charged to end users in a distri
bution zone consist of the sum ofthree elements:
a) The price of gas at the point of entry into the transportation
system,
b) The transportation rate, and
c) The distribution rate.
Transportation and distribution rates are determined through a
price cap methodology. The selhing price of gas is regulated through
benchmarking. The regulatory authority can limit passthrough gas
costs ifit finds that gas prices to end users exceed those negotiated by
other distributors under similar situations.
In the United Kingdom, the price cap formula which regulates
British Gas’ sales to customers who consume less than 25 000 therms
a year includes a term intended to regulate the passthrough of
gas costs. Prior to the date when the formula carne into opera-
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tion 47 average gas costs could be passed through in fuli. The term in
the new formula only permits the passthrough of an index GPI ofgas
costs which is based on the escalation clauses in British Gas contracts.
The costs that are allowed to be passed through under the cap are
given by an initial average cost ofgas, adjusted by the gas price index
less a 1% efficiency factor. IfBritish Gas is able to perform marketing
activities which permit the actual gas price to be below the cap, it can
retain the extra gains.
3.4. Policy Decisions
Gas regulatory authorities in Mexico decided to implement a mecha
nism that could protect captive customers from the market power of
a distributor who selis gas in its geographic zone without confronting
competition from any other economic agent. This mechanism aims to
strike a balance between the risks and incentives given to such a
distributor.
Of the three possible options considered, a simple passthrough
mechanism was discarded — despite its reduction ofthe distributor’s
real risk — because it provided little incentive for the distributor to
purchase gas efficiently.
The use of a yardstick to passthrough the costs of procuring gas
was not chosen either. This method would have been adequate only if
a competitive and transparent activity of gas commercialization had
already been present in the various distribution systems of Mexico.
However, this was not the case.
The methodology chosen to regulate the acquisition price of gas
was a variaion ofthe first two possible options considered. A distribu
tor is allowed to transfer its cost of acquiring gas as long as they are
less than or equal to a predetermined benchmark. This benchmark is
given by the regulated price of gas plus the regulated rates for
transporting and storing gas.
The mechanism establishes a cap on the gas purchased costs that
a distribution company can transfer to its customers. The formula is:
PA, = Acquisition price cap;
= Maximum cost that can be passed through;
T, = Total transportation cost:
A = Total storage cost, and
= Total volume.
Thus, to construct this cap, the methodology uses the domestic
gas price and the rate regulations described in sections 1 and 2. That
is, in distribution zones where most ofthe gas is brought from Mexican
fields the price ofgas will normally be capped by the national domestic
firsthand gas price, 18 while transportation costs must be in accordance
to regulated transport rates.
Nonetheless, this rnethodology does not preclude parties frorn
agreeing by contract to a price different frorn (even greater than) the
regulated acquisition price. However, in order to be eligible for this
contracting option a distributor must have a marketing subsidiary
which contracts with final consurners.
This paper had a twofold purpose. Qn one hand, it airned to survey the
theory and international experiences relevant for policy makers faced
with the challenge of designing a coherent and detailed price regula
tory frarnework. Qn the other hand, it sought to describe the rationales
that supported a policy decision proccss which listened to economic
theory, international experiences and market players.
The document presented an example of how complex economic
concepts were taken into account in reaching concrete decisions.
Therefore, it shows an example of how a bridge between abstract
theory and practice can be built, This should be of interest both to
‘ The price cap formula started to operate in 1992.
Vvhen a distiibutur i ant coanected tu a national pioductinii ticld, tun regulatoi’v
ant he ii tv may authori ze a rcference pid ce diffeent from thc ges regul ateci price.
where
DA
G 1 +T 1 +A,
y
4. Concluding Remarks
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theorists seeking to make innovations driven by real-world phenom
ena, as well as to policy makers who try to find sorne theoretical
guidance while in the churn of day-to-day operations.
Sorne lessons can be taken from the exercise that, from our point
ofview, should prove useful to both researchers and policy makers. A
brieflist of such lessons is:
• A perhaps trivial and sometimes forgotten lesson is that the
results of economic theory should always be taken with refe
rence to the assumptions ofthe model. A decision maker should
try to compare such assumptions with the prevailing real-world
conditions that are present before trying to apply any theoreti
cal result.
• Since theory is most often based on very restrictive assump
tions, it will be the unusual case in which reality and the
assumptions of economic theory coincide nicely. Nonetheless,
theory can always provide a useful reference framework for
policy making.
• Regulation is best perceived and applied only as a substitute for
competition. Regulatory measures should only be taken when
andwherenatural orartificial market power orbarriers to entry
into contestable markets exist.
• The general objective of regulatory authorities is to maximize
welfare subject to incentive and individual rationality con
straints of the firm. The solution to this problem should recon
cile several conflicting goals: i) provide enough rents to firms,
u) efficiently allocate rents between firms and consumers, and
iii) minimize the costs ofcarrying out regulation.
• While applying this general conceptual frameworl, regulatory
authority must not forget that regulated firms have more infor
mation than the authority does. However, authorities must also
be aware that the asymmetry-of-information problem can be
solved by applying methods ofregulation which induce firms to
reveal their true leve 1 of efficiency and to behave accordingly.
• Rate flexibility is important for firms that start new projects
since it helps them to appropriately handle risk and uncer
tainty. However, too much flexibility may also be detrirnental
for consurners. Therefore, flexibility in rates rnust go together
with cost reflective methodologies.
• Extremes in the application ofmethodologies are dangerous. It
is preferable to have a mix which extracts the best of each
methodology andwhich considers the specifics ofthe economic
environment. For example, price caps should be combined with
costofservice regulation and average revenue regulation should
be similarly accompanied by cost reflective methods.
• Regulatory strategies toward incipient and mature industries
may diverge. In general, a new industry requires ofa transition
phase where regulation is flexible enough to encourage initial
development. Also, this transition phase should seek to mode
rate large swings in certain variables (such as prices) that
accompany regulatory reform and that may undermine a regu
latory contract due to reductions in consumer surplus that are
too deep.
• Regulation itselfmust be sufficiently flexible in its structure so
that when a certain level ofmaturity is achieved in the industry,
regulation has the capacity to appropriately respond to such a
level and to prevailing market circumstances. As described in
section 2, several mechanisms were designed for the distribu
tion rate regulation in Mexico so that companies can deal with
the high risks involved during the first five years of a new
project. 49 That is, in the “consumer surplus-rationality con
straint ofthe firm” trade offthe designed regulation framework
initially favors more the firm and later takes care of long-run
welfare issues. 5 °
• Parties should have the option of freely contracting in any
regulatory scheme as long as viable regulated prices, rates and
terms and conditions of service exist as a fallback. However,
regulatory authorities should oversee contract activities to in
sure that they are not used improperly to achieve that which
regulation is fundamentally designed to prevent.
• Benchmarking is a plausible option as long as the appropriate
benchmark is selected.
Such first-five-year mechanisms include: the application of the correction factor occurs
also when the achieved revenue is less than the revenue cap; the value ofthc efficiency factor is
zero, and a kind oftariff-basket mechanism is only applied after the first five years.
It must be pointed out that this is not a sort of “gotcha’ proposition: ‘we the regulators
will give you ah the flexibility in the world until such time as you become successful; then we will
change the rules of the game and start social engineering with the capital that you have sunk
in the ground and cannot move in response to our now inflexible ‘long-run welfare’ requirements”.
This statement is not valid, since the long-run structure of the regulatory framework has been
legally established and implied intertemporal trade offs between consumers and firms are known
before the first day of operations of projects.
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